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n 1889, 1% of U.S. households owned about three-quarters of all net wealth in the
United States. See Thomas G. Shearman, The Owners of the United States, VIII
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certainly much better. The top 1% of
households own about 35% of the net
wealth in the U.S.
The outrageous figures of the late 19th
century in the United States are
attributable, in part, to the fact that most
of the wealth of the top 1% went
untaxed throughout that century,
because such wealth was kept in
corporations. Back then, corporations
were not taxable entities. The largest
conglomerates of the period all operated
in a corporate form, owned and
managed by America's richest. To name
a few examples, Standard Oil was
incorporated by John Davison
Rockefeller in 1870 in Ohio. The
American Sugar Refinery Company was
owned and managed by Henry Osborne
Havemeyer. The Vanderbilt and Gould
railroad empires operated through
multiple state-chartered corporations
incorporated during the 19th century,
and the Astors' fur trading empire was
operated, among others, via the
American Fur Company, incorporated in
New York in 1808. Such corporations
amassed non-taxable earnings
throughout the 19th century.
At the same time, low and middle-
class individuals carried the brunt of the
burden of financing the U.S. government
through tariffs and, on several occasions
throughout the 19th century, personal
income taxes.
It is this sorry state of affairs that
eventually led to the enactment of the
Corporate Excise Tax in 1909. Scholars
are continuously debating what exactly
Congress was trying to get at, namely,
whether it was the wealth of the Astors,
Vanderbilts, and Rockefellers, or whether
it was the power they accumulated
through the corporations. See Reuven
Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and
the State: A Defense of the Corporate
Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193 (2004); Steven
A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the
Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43
WV. & MARY L. REV. 447 (2001). The
bottom line justification for taxing
corporations, however, was clear-
corporate tax was a just tax. Indeed,
corporate taxation supports fairer society
in multiple ways.
First, and probably most importantly,
without corporate taxation corporations
will simply be used as an instrument to
avoid taxes. Shareholders would simply
stuff earnings in such entities, as
historically has been the case. This will
not only hurt revenues, but more
importantly would simply kill the idea of
progressive taxation. Corporate taxation,
for that matter, is a much needed
instrument to get at the wealth of
shareholders, thus maintaining horizontal
equity (when it comes to similarly
situated taxpayers only some of whom
own corporate stock) or vertical equity-
which is the more likely case-because
rich taxpayers have most of their income
generated from capital (such as
dividends and selling corporate stock),
and not from wages.
Second, in a world where the largest
corporations are publicly traded,
corporate taxation supports progressivity,
administratively speaking, as it is much
easier to collect tax at the entity level
than at the shareholder level. It also
serves to support an argument under
which corporate taxation is a fee for
liquidity. See Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who
Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat
Tax World?, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 965
(1989). In this context, it is important to
note that most equity in publicly traded
corporations in the U.S. is owned by
U.S. taxpayers, which in turn means that
taxation of such entities helps to support
the taxation of such U.S. residents in
their individual capacity.
Third, in the case of publicly traded
corporations, corporate taxation is also a
necessary tool to support good corporate
governance. In the absence of corporate
taxation, corporate managers who also
own equity in the corporation will have
their own interests in mind when making
corporate-level decisions that affect
shareholder-level taxes. When corporate
tax is imposed, managers' and
shareholders' interests are more closely
aligned, as they all have an interest in
reducing corporate level tax. In essence,
corporate taxation is an instrument to
address shareholder-level tax-
heterogeneity. See Hideki Kanda & Saul
Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the
Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV.
211 (1991). So again, corporate tax
supports the less-powerful in our society,
who happen to own some of their wealth
in the form of corporate stock.
Finally, corporate taxation, and the
reporting requirements associated with
it, puts government in a better position
to regulate unwanted behaviors by
corporate managers. In fact, this is
another explicit reason noted in support
of the enactment of the first functional
corporate tax in 1909. The abuse of
power by managers of wealthy
corporations was a real concern, and
corporate tax was understood to be part
of the solution. See Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and
the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax,
66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990).
We keep hearing that the tax rates in
the United States are the highest in the
world. We keep hearing that the
corporate tax puts U.S. corporations at a
competitive disadvantage. The
competitiveness arguments are, in fact,
false. There is no conclusive evidence to
support the argument that U.S.
corporations effectively pay more taxes
than their international counterparts. In
fact, a recent study suggests that U.S.
multinationals pay on average less than
their European counterparts. See Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah & Yaron Lahav, The
Effective Tax Rates of the Largest U.S.
and EU Multinationals, 65 TAX L. REV.
375 (2012). Some studies even suggest
that the corporate tax burden in the
United States is the second lowest in the
industrialized world. See Chuck Marr &
Brian Highsmith, Six Tests for Corporate
Tax Reform, CTR. ON BUDGET & PoLIcY
PRIORITIES, rev. Feb. 24, 2012, at 3,
available at http://www.cbpp.org/
files/2-28-11tax.pdf.
Unfortunately, these days it seems
that history repeats itself. When the
Apples, GEs and Googles of the world
operate multinational businesses, they
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can engage in tax planning techniques,
shifting income to their foreign
subsidiaries. These techniques are not
available to the local convenience store,
or the neighborhood plumber. Once
again, the top echelon of U.S. society
can keep its earnings untaxed, by
stuffing such earnings into corporations.
In substance, there is little difference
between today and the late 19th
century. The only difference is that
today's "corporations" are "foreign."
Those entities, of course, are not truly
"corporations" and they are not really
"foreign." They are, for the most part,
pocketbook entities, with no real
existence (except for a mailbox), wholly
owned by a U.S. parent. The burden is
thus shifted, once again, to small
business owners and to U.S. employees
whose main income is from salaries.
It is appropriate to end this argument
by quoting directly from President Taft's
message to Congress on June 16, 1909,
supporting the enactment of the first
functional corporate tax in the United
States (44 CONG. REC. 3344 (1909))
(Message from President Taft):
While the faculty of assuming a
corporate form has been of the utmost
utility in the business world, it is also
true that substantially all of the abuses
and all of the evils which have
aroused the public to the necessity of
reform were made possible by the use
of this very faculty. If now, by a
perfectly legitimate and effective
system of taxation, we are incidentally
able to possess the Government and
the stockholders and the public of the
knowledge of the real business
transactions and the gains and profits
of every corporation in the country, we
have made a long step toward that
supervisory control of corporations
which may prevent a further abuse
of power.
Corporate tax is still a just tax. We
need to tax more corporations, and we
need to tax them more. That is, of
course, unless the reality of the
19th-century wealth distribution is the
reality we want to get back to.
Affirmative
By Deborah A. Geier
T he old saw highlighted in the May 5,
2013, Wall Street Journal op-ed
piece by Congressman Kevin Brady (Tax
Reform Needs Accurate Tax Tables, at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014
24127887323309604578429013359
147292.html)-that we need to
integrate in order to lower the cost of
capital, which will, in turn, increase
business spending on buildings,
equipment, and software, which will, in
turn, increase labor productivity and
increase real wages, thus benefiting
American workers-is never supported
by any showing that businesses are
starved for investment dollars because
the cost of capital is so darn high,
making it difficult for businesses to form
and expand. That assumption appears to
be not just untrue but glaringly, obviously
untrue. Interest rates are at historic lows,
with lots of talk of a "global savings glut"
looking for places to invest. Indeed,
some argue that the chase for a place to
invest the global savings glut contributed
to the dot-com and housing bubbles.
And corporations are sitting on literally
trillions of undistributed profits-a huge
pool of untapped capital. The CRS report
at the time of the 2003 Bush integration
proposal said that the proposal was
unlikely to stimulate the economy.
The corporate tax levied essentially
only on publicly traded corporations can
be defended either as an appropriate toll
charge for liquidity (an enormous benefit)
or as a benefit tax to pay for the costs of
the regulated securities market.
Maintaining a regulated public market
ain't cheap, people. Those who mainly
benefit from it should pay for that benefit
via the corporate tax.
In 1977, the late, great Professor Mike
McIntyre of Wayne State published a
short piece in Tax Notes against
corporate integration in the style of the
17th-century French philosopher and
mathematician Blaise Pascal, who wrote
Pensees. Mike entitled it Pensees on
Integration: Where's the Reform? (at
http://faculty.law.wayne.edu/mcintyre/
text/mcintyre articles/Taxreform/
penseesrevisited.pdf). He updated it in
2003 at the time of the Bush proposal to
integrate via dividend exemption. I'm
going to channel Mike here by quoting a
few of his Pensees and adding a few of
my own.
* Why does the business community rail
against the double tax on profits and
keep silent on the double tax on wages
in the form of the Social Security and
Medicare taxes? Let them answer.
* Integration makes the simplifying
assumption that a corporation is the
docile agent of its shareholders. For
most publicly traded corporations,
however, a shareholder cannot obtain
his share of the profits at his discretion
without selling his stock at a price that
reflects retained earnings. If we do not
think that the corporation is the alter
ego of its shareholders, why do we
consider a corporate tax and a
shareholder tax to be a double tax? Is
it a double tax when a person hires a
maid, and both the maid and the
employer pay tax on the same
income? Double taxation is a slogan,
not an explanation.
* The corporate tax has had much
greater success than the income tax in
placing substantial tax burdens on the
rich. Why should we want to end our
most progressive tax?
* Objection. The incidence of the
corporate tax is on consumers (in the
form of higher prices) and labor (in the
form of reduced wages), both of which
are bad policy.
* Reply. If so, it results in a double tax
on consumers and workers, not on
shareholders. Tax relief for
shareholders would therefore be
doubly wrong.
* Some of the people who argue for
shareholder relief on the ground that
the corporation is the alter ego of the
FALL 2013 7
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shareholder oppose current taxation of
the earnings of controlled foreign
subsidiaries. A domestic company is
an alter ego but a foreign company
is not?
* Where is the "double tax" when a
tax-exempt foundation receives a
corporate dividend?
I will add that the tax-exempt sector
plays a major role in U.S. capital markets
and in the corporate capital market in
particular. The Treasury, in its 1992
integration study, recited that 46% of
corporate bonds and 37% of corporate
equity were held by tax-exempt entities.
The trend lines from 1950 to 1992 were
steeply up in that report, so I imagine
that their shares of corporate equity and
debt are higher today. The corporate
income paid out as interest on the
corporate bonds held by tax-exempts is
not subject to even a single level of tax.
Rather than integrate with respect to
equity distributions, we need reform so
that at least a single level of tax is
imposed on corporate profits paid to
tax-exempts!
Negative: The
United States Should
Repeal the Corporate
Income Tax
By David S. Miller
T he United States today does notimpose anything remotely resembling
a corporate income tax. And the United
States shouldn't impose one. Instead,
the United States should impose a more
rational tax on business.
To begin, the United States does not
impose a true corporate tax. Two-thirds
of all U.S. corporations are S
corporations and are not subject to any
corporate tax. And of the remaining
one-third of U.S. corporations, many
entirely avoid income tax altogether. For
example, regulated investment
companies, real estate investment trusts,
and tax-exempt organizations are
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completely or effectively exempt. So our
current business tax is not really a
corporate tax.
And for those relatively few U.S.
corporations that are subject to entity
level taxation, their tax liability bears no
evident relationship to income. Over the
past five years, Apple paid federal
income tax at an average rate of 8.2%,
Amazon paid 6.0%, Ford paid 4.2% and
Facebook paid 2.4%. On the other hand,
Walmart paid an average annual
effective rate of 33.6% and Disney
36.5%.
So the United States doesn't really tax
corporations and it doesn't really tax
income and it shouldn't.
But let's first ask: Why do we have a
corporate tax?
One justification for a corporate tax is
that it serves as a proxy for the taxation
of shareholders. Quite simply, it's easier
to collect the tax from a corporation than
the shareholders.
But is this really true? The United
States is perfectly capable of taxing
partners in master limited partnerships
and publicly-traded private equity firms.
So a corporate income tax is not
necessary to collect tax from the
shareholders.
The second justification for a
corporate tax is that it serves as a fee for
the benefits government provides to
shareholders (like limited liability) or as a
fee for liquidity for access to the capital
markets. But if the corporate tax was
ever a fee for limited liability, it certainly
is not today when limited liability is
available for noncorporate entities (like
limited liability companies), and the
corporate income tax isn't imposed on
many corporations. It's also hard to
justify the corporate tax as a fee for
liquidity because there's no relationship
between a corporation's income tax and
the liquidity of its stock.
The third justification for the corporate
tax is that it is needed to control the
excessive accumulation of power in the
hands of corporate management. But if
that's really true, why do the biggest
companies like Apple pay the lowest
rates of tax? And why do REITs and
mutual funds escape it entirely when
they may be managed by people with a
very small percentage of the
company's stock.
Whatever the justifications for a
corporate tax, they are far outweighed by
the detriments. Corporate tax is a tax
penalty on doing business in corporate
form; it discourages dividends; it
encourages debt; it encourages foreign
accumulation of earnings; and it requires
squadrons of tax lawyers to help avoid it.
We need to move away from the notion
of a corporate income tax towards a
rational system of business taxation.
Consider some alternatives. First is Ed
Kleinbard's business enterprise income
tax (or BElT). The BElT would tax all
businesses, regardless of their legal
form, based on their income less a cost
of capital allowance deduction equal to
the value of capital invested times the
risk-free rate. Interest would not be
deductible. Individuals would accrue tax
based on their investment times the
risk-free rate, plus an additional tax on
cash flows in excess of that rate.
Individuals could take a deduction if
cash returns are less than their risk-free
rate inclusions. Notably, the BElT is an
integrated income tax. All income is
taxable only once.
Alternatively, we could adopt Joseph
Dodge's proposal. We'd retain the current
single level of tax for private companies
like sole proprietorships, partnerships
and S corporations, repeal the corporate
level income tax, and tax shareholders of
public companies on a mark-to-market
basis. Again, under this system, all
income would be subject to a single level
of tax.
To wrap up, we don't really have a
corporate tax because we don't tax most
corporations; we don't really have an
income tax because tax liability bears
very little relationship to income; there's
really no good reason to have a
corporate tax; and, there are much better
alternatives.
PO.NT &.... COUNTERP
Affirmative:
Dividend Exemption
Is the Best Method
of Corporate/
Shareholder
Integration
By 0. Y. Mariant
t is a standard complaint that our
classical system of taxing corporations
is inefficient. Taxing the same income
twice, once at the corporate level and
once again at the shareholder level,
distorts behavior in many undesirable
ways. Thus, calls for the integration of
corporate and shareholder taxation have
long taken a central role in corporate tax
reform debates in the United States. The
question is, of course, how to best
achieve such integration?
As a preliminary matter, it is worth
differentiating between three major
schools of thought regarding corporate/
shareholder integration. Obviously, each
has its own offshoots and sub-schools of
thought, but the three major categories
are as follows: The first is an imputation
system, under which corporations are
taxed, and shareholders get credit for
their proportional share of corporate-level
tax; The second is a dividend deduction
system, in which corporations are
allowed a dividend paid deduction,
which effectively eliminates corporate
level tax; The third, and the one I shall
argue for, is an exemption system, under
which corporations are taxed at the
entity level, but distributions to
shareholders are exempt.
Selecting between the three methods
is hardly a new policy question. As much
as we like to think of ourselves as
leaders in the formulation of world tax
policy, corporate integration is an area in
which the United States is not. The
United States is in fact tailing the rest of
the world. Most other industrialized
countries have already engaged the
issue, and their comparative experiences
offer important insights.
One controlling trend in the past two
decades is that countries that abandon
the classical system of taxation usually
opt for the exemption method. Another
interesting trend is that countries that
already had integration systems in place
tend to abandon imputation systems in
favor of an exemption system. No
country that I am aware of has a
dividend deduction system in place.
Strikingly, 24 of the 36 OECD member
countries employ some form of
exemption. For a discussion on recent
trends, see Georg Kofler, Indirect Credit
versus Exemption: Double Taxation Relief
for Intercompany Distributions, BULL.
INT'L TAX'N, Feb. 2012, at 77. I believe
this comparative experience is a helpful
departure point. It demonstrates that
exemption is, in the eyes of many
jurisdictions, a preferable system of
integration. As I show, exemption is at
least as good as, but in most instances
preferable to, deduction or imputation by
any conceived benchmark.
First, there is the standard suggested
in the Bush administration 2003
proposal, which is that integration is
aimed at eliminating as much as
possible distortions created by corporate
tax. The Bush proposal mentions at least
three such distortions: the preferences
for debt over equity financing, the bias
against dividend distributions, and the
bias against operating in a C-corporation
form. Let's address each in turn.
1. In terms of bias against dividend
distributions, I think the issue has
been largely resolved by the Bush
tax cuts, and dividend exemption
will not change that. In this
context, imputation achieves the
same result. However, dividend
deduction, while eliminating
shareholders' bias against
dividends, creates strong incentives
for managers to distribute
dividends in order to eliminate
corporate level tax, even if
reinvestment is desirable. This
causes a new behavioral distortion.
2. The debt equity issue is unresolved
under all systems of integration.
Clearly, under an exemption
system, payment of interest is
preferred at the corporate level, but
this is also the case for imputation.
One could theoretically argue that
debt preference is solved in the
case of dividend deduction. See
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Amir
Chenchinski, The Case for Dividend
Deduction, 65 TAx LAw. 3 (2011).
That is not the case, however. To
obtain a deduction, dividends must
be distributed, while interest is
deducted even if accrued but not
paid. Thus, under a dividend
deduction system we have a strong
bias to distribute cash even if that
is not optimal. In turn, this creates
an incentive to finance new
investments with corporate level
debt, rather than using available
cash at hand.
3. The main issue stemming from the
Bush 2003 proposal is that an
integration system needs to achieve
the goal of single taxation, thus
eliminating the bias against
operation in a corporate form.
While all three suggested systems
achieve this main purpose, this
theoretical premise is only true if
we view the world as a single
t The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the author
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taxing jurisdiction, where all
corporations and all shareholders
are "domestic." Once we look at
cross-border transactions (aka
reality) only an exemption system
can unilaterally achieve single
taxation, while the other methods
would require foreign governments'
cooperation to achieve single
taxation.
In the case of dividend deduction,
single taxation to U.S. shareholders
of foreign corporations will be
achieved only if the foreign
jurisdiction also grants dividend
deduction. In the case of inbound
taxation, if the U.S. grants
deduction, but the foreign
jurisdiction in which foreign
shareholders reside has a territorial
system, then no tax is imposed.
(The reverse, of course is also
true if we grant an exemption but
a foreign jurisdiction grants a
deduction, there will be zero
taxation on outbound investment of
U.S. shareholders. That said, no
country currently grants deduction.)
Imputation will only achieve single
taxation if the shareholders can
obtain accurate information from a
foreign corporation's tax returns,
which is highly unlikely.
Exemption is preferable because it
is the only system that assures
single taxation in a globalized
environment. In such a case, U.S.
corporate tax will function as a
proxy for income tax of domestic
corporate shareholders, and as a
proxy for territorial taxation in the
case of foreign shareholders.
The second benchmark under which
we should evaluate the three possible
systems is as follows: whatever system
of integration we adopt must not interfere
with the policy purposes for which we
tax corporations to begin with. For that
purpose let me connect back to the
previous discussion, and let's assume
that a main purpose of corporate taxation
is to exert a tax burden on shareholders.
or to regulate managers of publicly held
entities.
If we seek to tax shareholders through
the taxation of corporations in which
they hold interests, this purpose is
achieved in both the exemption and
imputation methods. It is not necessarily
achieved in the context of dividend
deduction, because corporate level tax is
eliminated. For example, a tax-exempt
taxpayer that holds equity in a
corporation gets a windfall under a
deduction system.
If we want to regulate managers and
achieve better corporate governance,
exemption is the best system. It aligns
shareholders' and managers' tax
interests, because it is in the interest of
both groups to reduce corporate level
taxation, and they have no diverse tax
interest at the shareholder level.
Exemption eliminates the problem of
shareholder-level tax heterogeneity.
Imputation and deduction do not achieve
such results, because shareholder level
tax remains relevant.
The third benchmark, under which we
must decide which integration system is
preferred, is whether any adopted
system is expected to create new
distortions. For example, an exemption
levels the playing field between foreign
and domestic shareholders for inbound
investment in publicly traded
corporations. Both are subject to the
same tax at the entity level. Exemption
also creates a competitive environment
for outbound investment, because it
effectively achieves the same result as a
territorial system. Deduction and
imputation do not achieve such results.
For example, deduction essentially
exempts corporations from tax on U.S.
earnings, while dividend payment
depends on the tax treaty network. In
the case of outbound investment,
two-level tax remains a problem because
we cannot force foreign jurisdictions to
grant dividend deductions to U.S.-
controlled foreign corporations.
Imputation could theoretically achieve
the desired result, but it is simply
impractical, and indeed, countries who
adopted imputation in the past rarely
applied it to foreign shareholders.
Finally, the system we opt for should
be administratively feasible. Exemption is
the easiest system to administer
compared with the other alternatives.
There is only one relevant taxpayer: the
corporation. Imputation is clearly the
worst in terms of administration.
Deduction is probably not as bad, but
shareholders still must account for their
dividend income.
I think the comparative experience
with which I started is telling, but hardly
surprising. As I believe I have
demonstrated, compared to other
methods of integration, an exemption
system achieves most of the purposes of
integration, while generating little
headache in the process. It is therefore
the preferred mode of integration.
Affirmative
By Adam H. Rosenzweigt
E xemption is the best form of
integration for one simple reason:
nobody has any idea who bears the
incidence of the corporate income tax.
Both the deduction and imputation
methods implicitly assume that share-
holders bear the entire incidence of the
corporate income tax.
Take the following example: a
corporation would earn $1 million in net
profit absent an income tax. Now
introduce a 35% income tax. The
corporation would pay $350,000 in
cash tax out of the $1 million profit,
leaving only $650,000 to be distributed
to the shareholders, Under an imputation
method, the shareholders would receive
a distribution of $650,000, grossed up
to $1 million, and subject to a credit for
the $350,000 in taxes paid by the
corporation. Assuming a 40%
shareholder tax rate, the $1 million
dividend would result in $400,000 of
tax, offset by $350,000 in credits. The
shareholders would owe a net of
10 ABA SECTION OF TAXATION NEWSQUARTERLY
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$50,000 in cash tax, leaving a total of
$600,000 cash in pocket.
But instead assume that the
corporation could cut salaries by
$500,000-solely as a result of the
tax-such that its pre-tax income is now
$1,500,000. The corporation pays
$525,000 in taxes, leaving a total of
$975,000 in after-tax profits. The
corporation distributes the $975,000 to
the shareholders, grossed up to
$1,500,000 with a credit of $525,000.
The shareholders owe tax of $600,000
less the credit of $525,000, for a net of
$75,000 in cash taxes. This leaves
$900,000 cash in the pockets of the
shareholders. Now, instead of a 40% tax
on the $1 million of profit, the
shareholders bear only a 10% tax on the
$1 million of profit. Assuming a 40% tax
on salary, labor bears the $300,000
difference ($500,000 lost salary less
$200,000 in tax savings). If the tax rate
on labor is lower than the rate on
shareholders, the problem gets
even worse.
Of course, this is a simplified example,
but it demonstrates the idea that this
result occurs solely because the
shareholders are entitled to receive the
entire tax credit when they may bear
only a portion of the economic incidence
of the tax. Since there is no way to know
who bears the incidence of the corporate
income tax, and it could vary depending
on company or industry, this problem
will always arise under an
imputation method.
Under a deduction method
shareholders would bear the entire cost
of the tax on dividends. For shareholders
in many corporations this would result in
a net increase in taxes. Presumably,
then, at the margin (taking into account
capital gains taxes), under the deduction
method such shareholders would oppose
making distributions and prefer for the
corporation to pay an entity level tax. Put
differently, if shareholders are not
indirectly bearing the incidence of the
corporate level income tax why would
they agree to directly bear it through a
deduction method? For a discussion of
the tension between shareholders and
managers in the corporate integration
context, see Michael Doran, Managers,
Shareholders, and the Corporate Double
Tax, 95 VA. L. REv. 517 (2009).
Even worse, shareholders have
different tax attributes (the so-called
clientele effect). Some are tax-exempt
organizations, some are foreign
individuals, some are corporations
entitled to the dividends- received
deduction, and some are taxable U.S.
individuals. All of these constituencies
would prefer different dividend policies.
So instead of paying the tax through the
deduction or imputation method,
shareholders would simply sort
themselves according to their
preferences-exempt shareholders and
U.S. corporations would own dividend
paying stocks while taxable U.S. and
foreign individuals would own only
non-dividend paying stocks. See Mark P.
Gergen, How Corporate Integration Could
Kill the Market for Corporate Tax
Shelters, 61 TAx L. REv. 145 (2008).
Don't believe this would happen? Just
look at how many mutual fund shares as
opposed to tax-exempt bonds are owned
through tax-free retirement accounts.
The exemption method avoids all of
these problems. As my partner on this
resolution points out, for a similar reason
the exemption method also addresses a
number of international complications as
well. Taken together, the dividend
exemption method is clearly the best
form of integration.
Negative
By Deborah A. Geier
Dividend exemption is the worst 
form
of integration because it ignores
crucially important framing effects. With
the rise of the behavioral economics
movement, we all have become
increasingly aware of the importance of
cognitive biases and framing effects.
Integration using this method requires
the corporation to maintain both the EDA
(excludable dividend account) and REBA
(retained earnings basis adjustment). All
corporate-level earnings that are actually
taxed would be either actually or deemed
to be distributed. Actual distributions
from the EDA would be excluded, while
deemed distributions from the REBA
would increase stock basis, thereby
reducing gain on sale of the stock. Even
if we assume that the incidence of the
corporate-level tax paid falls on these
same shareholders, the amount actually
included on their individual tax returns
would plummet, which would result in
the public's perception that the rich are
not paying much income tax. Polls show
that much of the public already believes
that-rightly or wrongly. This particular
route to integration would even worsen
that perception.
The vast majority of qualified
dividends and capital gains are realized
by the very rich. Marty Sullivan's work in
Tax Notes (Is the Income Tax Really
Progressive?, 125 TAX NOTES 1135
(2009)) demonstrates that even those
with AGI between $200,000 and
$500,000 realize only 12.5% of that
AGI in the form of qualified dividends
and capital gains. In contrast, those with
more than $10 million of AGI see more
than 60% of it in the forms of qualified
dividends and capital gains. As Len
Burman noted in his recent Senate
Finance testimony (Tax Reform and the
Tax Treatment of Capital Gains: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Finance and
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
112th Cong. (2012) (Statement of
Leonard E. Burman), at www.finance.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/092012%20
Burman%20Testimony.pdf), in 2010
the top 1% realized almost 70% of
capital gains and the richest 1 in 1,000
households accrued about 47%. Only
1.1% of the tax preference accorded to
net capital gain and qualified dividends
is enjoyed by taxpayers in the bottom
60%. The Tax Policy Center estimated
that the top 1% would capture 42% of
the benefit of the dividend exclusion
approach in the Bush 2003 proposal.
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Because of this concentration of qualified
dividends and capital gains in the richest
households, Marty Sullivan has shown
that effective tax rates of the merely rich
are higher than for the very rich. (Is the
Income Tax Really Progressive?, 125 TAX
NOTES 1135 (2009), and Busting Myths
About Rich People's Taxes, 135 TAX
NOTES 251 (2012).)
These framing effects are important. In
the last election, it was widely reported
that President Obama paid an effective
federal income tax rate of 26.3% in 2010
on AGI of $1.7 million, while Governor
Romney paid an effective federal income
tax rate of only 13.9% on AGI of $21.6
million. While the usual suspects argued
that Romney's effective tax rate was
actually much higher than it appeared
because he indirectly suffered the
incidence of the corporate tax, the general
public wasn't buying it. (As an aside, I
have to add that it's ironic that these
same outlets that argued that Romney's
effective tax rate was higher than it
appeared because he indirectly paid the
corporate tax also consistently argue that
the corporate tax is unfair because its falls
mainly on labor, not capital. Can't argue
out of both sides of your mouth, people!)
At bottom, because of these framing
effects, the tax event must remain visually
at the owner level if it is to have any
chance of broad-based support.
In addition, state and local
governments that base their own
individual income tax bases on federal
AGI would suffer significant reductions in
revenue with dividend exemption and
REBAs. States would also have a much
harder time issuing tax-exempt bonds if
dividends are also wholly or partially
exempt. Moreover, tax-exempt dividends
would significantly increase the
opportunities for tax-rate arbitrage tax
shelters. Just as section 265(a)(2) is
impossible to police with respect to 103
bonds, so would be any concomitant
provision with respect to tax-exempt
dividends.
Dividend exclusion does nothing to
reduce the biggest distortion of the
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classical corporate tax system: the
incentive to capitalize with debt rather
than equity.
In the closely held Sub C context (as
opposed to the Sub S context), the
dividend exclusion would create a new
preference for dividend distributions over
salary payments to employee-
shareholders, which would reduce the
amount of payroll taxes going to the
Medicare and Social Security trust funds,
exacerbating the perilous position of the
Medicare fund in particular. In other
words, the John Edwards and Newt
Gingrich gambits would migrate from
Sub S to Sub C.
Under the CBIT (Comprehensive
Business Income Tax) as an alternative
to dividend exemption, both shareholders
and bondholders would exclude the
dividends and interest received, and the
corporation would deduct neither. The
benefit of the CBIT approach to
integration is that it does away with the
bias for debt-financing, but it suffers
from the same fatal flaw as dividend
exemption: exclusion at the owner level.
That's a no-go.
A much better method of integration is
one that lodges the tax event at the
shareholder-level, either through a
dividends-paid deduction to the extent
that the dividend is paid out of actually
taxed corporate-level income, a credit
imputation method like those once
enjoyed by European countries before
the ECJ ruled them discriminatory
because they provided no credit to
foreigners receiving dividends, or a
mark-to-market system for publicly
traded stock like the one described by
Joseph Dodge (A Combined Mark-to-
Market and Pass-Through Corporate
Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX
LAw REv. 265 (1995)). More on a
modified version of that third possibility
under the third resolution.
There is a final point to stress with
respect to either a dividends-paid
deduction or dividend exclusion system.
Every such proposal deems distributions
to come first from post-enactment,
corporate-taxed income. Under the Bush
proposal, for example, distributions
would be deemed to come first from the
EDA (resulting in exclusion), then from
the cumulative REBA (or CREBA) (also
resulting in exclusion but also a stock
basis reduction), and only last from
untaxed corporate income (resulting in
inclusion). These includable dividends
represent undistributed E&P at the time
of enactment or current-year corporate-
level preference income. The fair rule-if
we are to be stuck with dividend
exemption or a dividends-paid
deduction-is to treat all distributions as
made first out of pre-enactment
undistributed E&P (until fully
distributed)-no dividends exclusion or
dividends-paid deduction; second out of
current-year preference income ditto;
and only third out of corporate-level
taxed income (excludable under the
exemption system or nondeductible
under the dividends-paid deduction
approach). To defer or even forgive, in
effect, the shareholder tax on pre-
enactment earnings would be to grant a
huge capital windfall to those who had
received the maximum deferral benefit
from the separate-entity theory of the
corporate tax. Here's one of my favorites
from Mike McIntyre's Pensees: Should a
supporter of integration also support a
large capital levy to soak up the windfall
gain resulting from the end of the
two-tier system? Or is the whole purpose
of integration to create a windfall gain?
Negative
By David S. Miller
D ividend exemption would be the
worst way to achieve integration,
especially where, as today, the individual
income tax rate exceeds the corporate
rate. First, a dividend exemption would
provide a pure subsidy to taxpayers in
the highest bracket and would dilute the
progressivity of our tax system. Second,
it would obligate the United States to
provide the exemption to residents of its
treaty partners. Third, it would tend to
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enhance the subsidy of equities over
fixed income securities. Fourth, it would
be very difficult to ensure that the
exempted dividends really are subject to
corporate tax. And, finally, a dividend
exemption would tend to increase the
rates on tax-exempt bonds and decrease
state tax revenues, squeezing states and
municipalities.
The corporate income tax rate is 35%,
and the highest individual marginal rate
on ordinary income is effectively 44.7%
(after taking into account the 3% Pease
limitation and the 3.8% Medicare tax).
Assume a corporation earns $100, pays
$35 in corporate income tax and
distributes the remaining $65. If an
individual can exclude the $65, she will
be subject to aggregate tax at a rate of
only 35%, which is much lower than the
highest marginal rate, which is at least
39.6%. In this case, the individual is
much better off than she would have
been had the business been run as a
sole proprietorship.
Affirmative
By Adam H. Rosenzweig§
T he United States has the higheststatutory corporate income tax rate in
the OECD. More troubling, however, is
that this has not occurred due to any
affirmative policy choice by the United
States to charge a higher corporate tax
rate than the other OECD member
countries, but rather merely due to
attrition over time as every OECD
member country other than the United
States has lowered its corporate income
tax rate. At a minimum, this proves it is
time to revisit the statutory corporate tax
rate and what it should be. The best
answer would be to lower the corporate
Moreover, this high income individual
would have paid tax on the corporate
income of $100 at the same combined
marginal rate as a shareholder in the
lowest marginal rate so the exemption
system is not at all progressive. And,
because wealthy taxpayers have
disproportionately more stock than poor
taxpayers, wealthy taxpayers would
enjoy a disproportionate benefit from
the exemption.
Second, if the United States exempts
its own residents from tax on dividends,
under the nondiscrimination provision of
many treaties, it would have to exempt
dividends paid to residents of the treaty
jurisdiction. So the United States would
lose the tax it collects from these
foreign investors.
Third, because for high income
taxpayers, corporate earnings would
enjoy a lower effective rate than bonds,
exempting dividends would increase the
subsidy that equities enjoy over bonds.
tax rate below 35% in a revenue
neutral way.
It is often argued that having a high
corporate income tax rate makes U.S.
business unable to compete with foreign
owned business. It is often unclear,
however, what competitiveness means in
this context. Does it mean access to
capital? Does it mean prices charged to
consumers?
For this reason, competitiveness alone
is not a reason to reduce the corporate
income tax rate. If it were, the corporate
income tax rate should be reduced
across the board, and dramatically so,
regardless of revenue.
Instead, the corporate income tax
should be reduced in a revenue neutral
way, but not for traditional
competitiveness reasons. Rather, the rate
Fourth, it will be difficult to exempt
only the portion of corporate profits that
are subject to corporate tax. Assume that
a shareholder contributes $1,000 to a
wholly-owned corporation. The
corporation has a $100 loss in year one
and $100 of income in year two, uses its
year one loss to offset the income in year
two (so it pays no corporate tax), and
distributes $100 in year two. If an
individual shareholder could exclude the
distribution without reducing his basis,
he'd be able to sell his stock for a tax
loss without suffering any economic loss.
We'd need a complicated system to
prevent corporations from being used to
generate tax losses in this manner.
Finally, if dividends become exempt,
tax-exempt bonds become less
attractive, which would raise tax-exempt
bond rates. Also, since states piggyback
on federal taxable income, if dividends
are exempt, states would collect
less revenue.
should be reduced due to the
combination of the distributional impact
of the high statutory rate and the
competitive pressures on multinational
businesses to manipulate their effective
tax rates. More specifically, a high
statutory rate results in companies with
highly mobile tax bases and
multinational business models using
aggressive tax strategies to lower their
overall worldwide effective tax rate.
Meanwhile, those companies with
immobile tax bases or primarily domestic
business models are left paying the
higher tax rates. As an example, it has
been reported that Apple paid federal
income tax at an average rate of 8.2%
and Facebook paid 2.4% while Walmart
paid an average annual effective rate of
33.6% and Disney 36.5%.
§ The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the author.
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Why the disparity? Has there been an
affirmative policy choice of the United
States to tax Walmart at a higher rate to
subsidize Apple? Is there a reason for
Disney to pay more to subsidize
Facebook? Of course, the answer is no.
This is merely the result of the
interaction of international competitive
pressures and a high statutory corporate
income tax rate. Companies like Apple
with highly mobile intellectual property
and worldwide sales feel the need to
aggressively lower their effective rates
through offshore planning because their
competitors are doing so, while it would
be much more difficult for Walmart to do
so for the simple reason that Walmart
owns (and sells) a lot of real, tangible
stuff inside the United States. So if the
goal is to equalize the tax treatment of
primarily domestic U.S. corporations and
primarily multinational ones, the answer
must be to lower the nominal tax rate in
a revenue neutral way.
There are other benefits from lowering
the rate as well. Lower rates would make
evasion less profitable, meaning on the
margins fewer corporations would
engage in wasteful tax planning rather
than productive investment. Since
corporations on the margin were not
paying the tax to begin with, the
efficiency gains would be free money to
the economy. There is even a chance
that corporations would pay slightly more
tax in a lower rate world to take
advantage of the certainty of completely
legal taxes at a lower rate rather than
exploiting potentially risky tax avoidance
structures under a higher rate. Even so,
it is unlikely that the increased efficiency
gains plus any certainty gains generated
from those corporations on the margin
would be sufficient to offset the
reduction in corporate revenue incurred
by lowering the statutory tax rate on all
corporations. So some other revenue
would be necessary to lower the
statutory corporate tax rate in a revenue
neutral way.
The traditional way to do this would
be to lower the rate while broadening the
base, say by repealing accelerated
depreciation, or increasing the scope of
the Subpart F anti-deferral regime, or
adding to the number of foreign tax
credit baskets, or capping corporate
research and development credits. The
problem with these approaches is that,
in the past, the base broadening
measures have seemed to have little
long-term effect-as increasingly clever
corporations find increasingly clever
ways around them-while the statutory
rate reductions become permanent.
Perhaps, then, it is time to reconsider
what revenue neutral means in this
context. There is no reason it need be
limited to base broadening. For example,
what about a corporate excess profits tax
to make more profitable corporations
subsidize less successful ones? Or a
carbon emissions excise tax to force
polluting companies to subsidize clean
ones? Other proposals, including one
described by my partner on this
resolution, could be considered as well.
All of these would raise revenue to offset
the statutory rate reduction. But what
becomes clear is that no choice of
revenue instrument is neutral. Any
choice to increase revenue to offset other
cuts must have distributional
consequences. Both sides, therefore,
should have affirmative policy goals built
into them.
Once we move away from tying rate
reductions to base broadening, there is
no reason to limit ourselves to these
more traditional tools. In fact, if the point
of lowering the corporate tax rate is to
equalize the treatment of similarly
situated corporations (at least based on
income), why not explicitly tie the
corporate tax rate to this goal instead of
indirectly trying to get there through
other means? In other words, perhaps
lowering the corporate tax rate in a
revenue neutral way would mean
abandoning the notion of having a single
corporate tax rate applicable (effectively)
to all corporations and replacing it with a
dynamic, self-adjusting tax rate in which
every corporation would pay its own
company-specific tax rate.
What would a dynamic, self-adjusting
tax rate look like? First, consider the
incidence of the corporate tax. When a
corporation pays tax, who ultimately
bears the cost-consumers, labor or
capital? The well-established answer is
... nobody knows. Even worse, it is not
just that nobody knows but that nobody
can know, as it depends on the relative
elasticity of these three groups. But one
thing we can know is that during periods
of very high unemployment and near
zero interest rates, the elasticity of labor
becomes much lower than that of
capital, at least as compared to more
"normal" times of lower unemployment
and higher interest rates. In such a case,
the incidence of the corporate tax would
increasingly be shifted onto labor and
away from capital as compared to
"normal" times.
So perhaps in response the corporate
tax rate should float on a company-by-
company basis in some way to reflect
this. Although there are a number of
potential ways to do so, one would be to
reduce the corporate tax rate for
corporations that do not shift the cost of
the tax onto labor while, at the same
time, increasing the corporate tax rate for
corporations that do. The details in
getting there may be a little messy, for
example it may require comparing each
individual corporation's employment
decisions to some independent metric
such as regional or sectoral
unemployment. But there is no reason to
believe this would be more complex,
messy, or difficult to implement than the
current income tax with high rates and
the resulting transfer pricing, hybrid
equity instruments, Double Irish Dutch
sandwiches, and reverse hybrid
structures, among others.
As a result, the corporate income tax
would no longer treat companies
differently based on the happenstance of
their business model or whether they are
primarily domestic or multinational.
Some corporations would pay more
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under the dynamic self-adjusting tax
than under current law and some would
pay less, but overall (based on relatively
reasonable assumptions) these should
wash out over time. Taken together,
reducing the corporate income tax rate in
this manner could prove not only
revenue neutral but also pro-growth and
pro-employment, all at the same time.
For a more detailed discussion, see
Adam H. Rosenzweig, A Corporate Tax
for the Next One Hundred Years:
Incorporating Macro-Economic
Conditions and Fiscal Policy into the
Corporate Income Tax, 108 Nw. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2327852.
What is clear is that the current
system is not necessarily better than the
alternatives simply because it came first.
High statutory rates lead to perverse
distributional consequences with little to
no policy behind them. If the United
States wants to subsidize companies
with significant intellectual property over
those with significant inventory, or
capital intensive industries over labor
intensive ones, or multinational
industries over domestic ones, it should
do so explicitly. But the current model
where this occurs unintentionally due to
the combination of a high statutory rate
and the ability of some, but not all,
corporations to structure around it is the
worst of all worlds.
The time to change the statutory tax
rate in a revenue neutral manner is now.
Affirmative
By Deborah A. Geier
am focusing on the "revenue-neutral
way." We need to combine lower
section 11 rates with (1) mark-to-market
taxation for publicly traded securities (at
ordinary rates), extending Dave Camp's
proposal to require mark-to-market
taxation of derivatives, (2) forced
pass-through taxation for all non-publicly
traded stock, including corporate
subsidiaries, to reduce the games-play-
ing that would otherwise arise with a low
section 11 tax and no mark-to-market
tax at the owner level, and (3) repeal of
CFC deferral. In light of the data that I
provided earlier regarding the extreme
concentration of these holdings by the
very wealthy, mark-to-market taxation of
publicly traded stock is the only way that
would have a hope of being distribution-
ally neutral, and that's imperative.
But it's even better than that! It's the
best of all worlds. It would decrease the
significant revenue loss under section
1014. It would provide a powerful
counter-cyclical effect on the bursting of
our inevitable stock-market bubbles. It
would be administratively easy (unlike
with mark-to-market taxation of other
sorts of assets). It would be defensible
because holders of publicly traded stocks
benefit hugely from easy liquidity-or
Goldman Sachs and Facebook would
never have gone public, and firms would
never have rushed to do IPOs during the
dot-com craze. They should pay not only
for liquidity access but also for the
government costs incurred to regulate
the public securities market. It would
eliminate the need for the E&P concept
for distributions, would reduce the
lock-in and bunching effects (if real), etc.
Finally, we must eliminate deferral of
CFC income. It's the second largest
corporate tax expenditure (after only
accelerated depreciation), and it applies
almost wholly in the Sub C context
(unlike depreciation). Ending deferral is
the only sane way to deal with the
intractable transfer-pricing abuses that
unequivocally eliminate tax on what
should be considered U.S.-source
income, in addition to creating untaxed
stateless income, as so well described
by Ed Kleinbard. The territoriality
alternative exacerbates these problems.
I would love to get this scored. My
guess is that requiring mark-to-market
taxation of publicly traded stock (taxed at
ordinary rates) and forcing pass-through
taxation of all privately held entities,
including CFC income, would likely
permit a section 11 rate that is lower
than any of the current proposals. It's the
best of all worlds! Let's do it!
Negative: It Is
Impossible to Reduce
the Corporate Income
Tax Rate in a Revenue
Neutral Manner
By David S. Miller
W e can't possibly reduce the
corporate tax rate in a revenue
neutral way, and we shouldn't even try.
First, why would we even try to
reduce the corporate tax rate? The only
reason ever given is to improve the
competitiveness of U.S. multinationals.
But that's exactly why Germany lowered
its combined tax rate to 30% in 2008;
and, as Omri Marian pointed out in his
2012 Virginia Tax Review article, this
effort was at best only a mild
improvement and at worst an
utter failure.
In fact, if we reduce corporate tax
rates in a revenue neutral way, we imply
that the average effective rate remains
the same. How are U.S. multinationals
going to be any more competitive if their
average effective rate stays the same? At
best, Disney, which is subject to a
36.5% effective rate, would become
more competitive, but GE, which pays
tax at a 3.6% rate, would become less
so. Moreover, if the real competition is
with tax havens (as some have argued),
reducing the tax rate won't have any real
effect because 25% is still much more
than 0% or even 12.5%.
So if the reason to reduce corporate
tax rates is to improve competitiveness,
but it won't have that effect, we
shouldn't bother.
Second, it's utterly impossible to
reduce corporate rates in a revenue
neutral way. The number one corporate
tax expenditure is accelerated
depreciation. Accelerated depreciation is
responsible for about 30% of corporate
revenue loss. But accelerated
depreciation is responsible for 80% of
individual business revenue loss.
Revenue neutrality would mean that we
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reduce accelerated depreciation only for
C corporations.
But if we eliminate accelerated
depreciation only for C corporations,
then individuals will develop their
businesses and depreciate their assets
through sole proprietorships and
partnerships and claim deductions at the
high individual rate, and then contribute
the business assets to C corporations
and shelter the income at the lower
corporate rate.
While Congress could repeal
accelerated depreciation for all
businesses in order to generate sufficient
revenue to reduce the corporate tax rate,
this is hardly revenue neutral from the
perspective of the small business owner,
who would pay a higher effective rate
without any benefit. And because the
repeal of accelerated depreciation would
hurt small business owners, it has no
chance of enactment.
Besides, if we reduced accelerated
depreciation, we would remove the
single greatest tax incentive for new
investment. This is one reason that
economists object to the idea of revenue
neutral rate reduction. The other
objection is that revenue neutral rate
reduction would reward old capital, that
is, existing investments made in the
previous high-tax environment whose
returns will enjoy the lower tax
environment. m
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